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Abstract. Custodian is a core financial service in which the custodian holds in safekeeping
assets on behalf of the client. Although traditional custody service is typically endorsed by
centralized authorities, decentralized custody scheme has become technically feasible since the
emergence of digital assets, and furthermore it is badly needed by new applications such as
blockchain and DeFi (Decentralized Finance).
In this work, we propose a framework of decentralized asset custody scheme that is able to
support a large number of custodians and safely hold customer assets of multiple times value
of the total security deposit. The proposed custody scheme distributes custodians and assets
into many custodian groups via combinatorial designs and random sampling, where each group
fully controls the assigned assets. Since every custodian group is small, the overhead cost is
significantly reduced. The liveness is also improved because even a single alive group would be
able to process transactions. The security of this custody scheme is guaranteed in the game-
theoretic sense, such that any adversary corrupting a bounded fraction of custodians cannot
move assets more than his own security deposit. We further analyze the security and perfor-
mance of our constructions, and give explicit examples with concrete numbers and figures for
a better understanding of our results.
Keywords: Decentralized asset custody · Mechanism design · Group assignment scheme ·
Game-theoretic security.
1 Introduction
Custody is a core financial service in which an institution, known as the custodian, holds in safekeeping
assets such as stocks, bonds, precious metals and currency on behalf of the client. Custody service
reduces the risk of clients losing their assets or having them stolen, and in many scenarios a third
party custodian is required by regulation to avoid systematic risk. In general, security is the most
important reason why people use custody service and place their assets for safekeeping in custodian
institutions.
The security of traditional custody service is usually endorsed by the reputation of the custodian,
together with the legal and regulatory system. Such centralized endorsement used to be the only viable
option until the emergence of digital assets. A major advantage of digital assets over their physical
counterparts is that they are intrinsically integrated with information technology such as Internet
and modern cryptography. Along with the evolution of cryptographic authentication technology,
e.g. multiple/threshold signature scheme and zero-knowledge proof systems, it becomes technically
feasible to have in safekeeping assets held by multiple custodians, so that no single custodian is able
to use the assets covertly.
From a systematic point of view, custody service provided by a federation of multiple independent
custodian has better robustness and resistance against single point failure, and hence achieves a higher
level of security. Such credit enhancement is especially important for safekeeping of cryptoassets on
decentralized blockchains such as Bitcoin [21] and Ethereum [33], where the legal and regulatory
system is absent or at least way behind the development of applications. For example, the largest
cryptocurrency exchange at that time, Mt. Gox, announced that approximately 850,000 bitcoins were
stolen and went bankrupt in 2014 [31]; and in the year 2019 alone, at least 7 cryptocurrency exchanges
claimed being hacked and loss of cryptoassets totaled to around 1.39 billion dollars [2]. However, it
is difficult for customers to distinguish that whether the claimed loss was caused by hacker attack or
internal fraud and embezzlement, and hence raises the need for decentralized custody.
Decentralized custody finds applications in many scenarios related to blockchain and digital fi-
nance. A motivating example is the cross-chain asset mapping service which maps cryptoassets on one
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blockchain to tokens on another blockchain for inter-chain operability. For instance, the mapping from
Bitcoin to Ethereum enables usage of tokens representing bitcoins within Ethereum ecosystem, and
in the meanwhile, the original bitcoins must be safeguarded so that the bitcoin tokens are guaranteed
redeemable for real bitcoins in full. Nowadays the volume of cryptoassets invested into Ethereum DeFi
applications has been increasing at an extraordinary pace and broke two billion dollars recently [1],
among which a significant fraction (e.g. hBTC [15], imBTC [29], tBTC [19], wBTC [30], renBTC [25],
etc.) is mapped from Bitcoin. Due to the reality that most of those DeFi applications and tokens
remain in a gray area of regulation, decentralized cryptoasset custody (within or across institutions)
turns out an attractive approach for better security and credit enhancement.
In this work, we propose a framework of decentralized asset custody scheme which is secure in the
game-theoretic sense. More specifically, custodians and assets are distributed into multiple custodian
groups, where each group consists of few custodians as its members and fully controls a small portion of
in safekeeping assets. The authentication of each custodian group can be implemented with voting or
threshold signature among group members. Under this framework transactions can be processed more
efficiently within group members, since the computational and communicational cost is significantly
reduced. The liveness and robustness is also improved since even a single alive custodian group is
able to process some transactions.
The security of our proposed custody scheme is guaranteed in a game-theoretic sense: every
custodian in this scheme must offer a fund as security deposit, and the system remains secure as long
as an adversary cannot steal more asset than his deposit, i.e. comparing to launching an attack the
adversary would be better off by just withdrawing the security deposit of custodian nodes under his
control. Specifically, we prove that for adversary corrupting a bounded fraction of custodians, the
proposed decentralized custody scheme is able to safeguard customer assets of multiple times value
of the total security deposit.
1.1 Related Works
The prototype of decentralized custody scheme first appears in Bitcoin as multisignature (multisig)
[6], where the authentication requires signatures from multiple private keys rather than a single
signature from one key. For example, an M -of-N address requires signatures by M out of totally N
predetermined private keys to move the money. This na¨ıve scheme works well for small M and N
but cannot scale out, because the computational and communicational cost of authenticating and
validating each transaction grows linearly in M and N . Both efficiency and liveness of the scheme are
compromised for large M and N , especially in the sleepy model proposed by Pass and Shi [22] where
key holders do not always response in time. In practice, multisignature scheme is typically used at
wallet level rather than as a public service, since the scheme becomes costly for large N and most
Bitcoin wallets only support N ≤ 7.
Multisignature schemes may be coupled with advanced digital signature techniques such as thresh-
old signature [7, 13] or aggregate signature [4, 20, 27] to reduce the cost of verifying multi-signed sig-
natures. However, the signing process still requires involvement of at least M parties and the cost
of communication can hardly be significantly reduced. Furthermore we remark that these advanced
signature techniques are also compatible with our scheme, as authentication mechanism for single
custodian groups.
There are also custody solutions based on scripts or contract codes. These schemes usually only
work within a single blockchain since it is difficult to get reliable information outside the consensus
boundary, which essentially requires an oracle. Although there are techniques such as Atomic Swap [5]
and Hashlock/Hash TimeLock Contracts (HTLC) [6] enabling code-based cross-chain interoperability,
the use cases are limited and far from being able to provide general purpose custody service.
As for the cross-chain asset mapping service, existing solutions include following three types:
– Centralized: custody in a trusted central authority, with the endorsement fully from that authority,
e.g. hBTC [15], wBTC [30] and imBTC [29];
– Consortium: custody in multisignature accounts controlled by an alliance of members, and en-
dorsed by all alliance members, e.g. cBTC [9] (in its current version) and Polkadot [32];
– Decentralized (with deposit/collateral): custody provided by permissionless custodians, with se-
curity guaranteed by over-collateralized cryptoassets, e.g. tBTC [19] and renBTC [25].
Although the last type seems satisfiable in decentralization and security against single point fail-
ure and collusion, there are significant drawbacks as well: the first drawback is the inefficiency of
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over-collateralization, i.e. tBTC requires the custodian to provide collateral worth of 150% value of
customer’s assets, and renBTC requires 300%; the second drawback is that the collateral is not the
same type as the in safekeeping assets, and hence it may be insufficient to endorse safety of the
custody service in market volatility.
Furthermore, we remark that tBTC and renBTC have security guaranteed in the game-theoretic
sense that an adversary will not launch a non-profitable attack, and renBTC even partition custodi-
ans (i.e. Darknodes in its context) into groups for better efficiency and liveness. However, renBTC
applies the trivial non-overlapping group partition and hence it has poor capital efficiency. More
importantly, it cannot support homogeneous collateral as in safekeeping assets, since otherwise an
adversary corrupting a single group will be able to control more assets than his own security deposit.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this work, we propose the framework of implementing decentralized asset custody scheme with
overlapping group assignments, where such group assignment consists of many subsets of custodians
as groups, and each group is controlled by few group members and holds a small faction of the total
assets including both funds from customers and security deposit from custodians.
By distributing in safekeeping assets into many small custodian groups, every customer-requested
transaction can be assigned to a specific custodian group and thereafter processed within the group
members. Thus each transaction only requires attention and approval from custodians in that small
group (rather than a majority of all participants in the scheme), which reduces the cost and latency of
transaction processing. Furthermore this framework provides better liveness guarantee, since transac-
tion can be processed even if only one single custodian group has sufficient many members available
online, and in the mean while the vast majority of custodians in the system can stay offline.
Our custody scheme achieves security in the game-theoretic sense that for an adversary corrupting
γ fraction of individual custodians and γ is not too large, the number of corrupted groups would be
less than γ. Therefore, the adversary cannot jeopardize the system as long as the total security deposit
of corrupted custodians outweighs the total assets held by corrupted groups, since any loss caused by
such an adversary can be easily compensated with security deposits of misbehaved custodians.
The model of our decentralized custody scheme is formalized in Section 3, where we formally
define security of a decentralized custody scheme. Furthermore we introduce the notion of efficiency
factor η to measure the capital efficiency, which measures the capability of safely holding assets for
exterior customers with a fixed total amount of security deposit.
We propose in Section 4 specific constructions of the underlying group assignments based on enu-
meration of all subsets of a fixed size and two kinds of combinatorial designs respectively. We also
analyze the security and efficiency factors of custody schemes induced by these constructions. For
example, we show it is possible to assign 20 custodians into 38, 760 groups such that as long as adver-
sary corrupts γ ≤ 2/5 fraction of all custodians, the whole custody scheme is capable of safekeeping
assets worthy of η > 20 times of total security deposits, i.e. the scheme can safely hold over 100 units
of value with total security deposit of 5 unit. Furthermore, based on the polynomial combinatorial de-
sign, the decentralized custody scheme is able to support 121 participants as custodians with 161, 051
groups such that the efficiency factor η > 60 against any adversary corrupting no more than 2/11
of custodians. In general, the efficiency factor is better for larger number of participants and groups,
except for the drawback that the number of groups grows polynomially in the number of participants
and hence soon becomes infeasible to manage in practice.
To mitigate the problem of too many groups in one assignment, we apply a random sampling
on the group assignment and prove that with high probability the newly sampled assignment has a
comparable efficiency factor. More specifically, if the original custody scheme consists of n participants
and has the efficiency factor η against adversary corrupting at most γ faction of all participants, then
by sampling O
(
nη · log(γ−1)/γ) ∼ O (nη) many groups the newly generated custody scheme would
have efficiency factor η′ ≥ √η + 1−2 against the same adversary with high probability. See Section 5
for the precise statement and more details.
Concretely, using the random sampling technique we are able to construct a custody scheme
of 1000 participants and 323, 825 groups such that the efficiency factor η > 10 against adversary
corrupting up to 388 participants.
In Section 6 we investigate the complexity of finding optimal corrupting solutions. We prove that
given a group assignment, it is easy to find a solution no worse than average case but it turns out NP-
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hard to find an optimal corrupting strategy in general. However, this is still insufficient to complement
the randomized sampling construction as a validation method.
2 Preliminaries
Hypergeometric distribution and tail bound. A hypergeometric distribution H(N,K, n) is a discrete
probability distribution with the following probability mass function:
Pr[H(N,K, n) = k] =
(
K
k
)(
N−K
n−k
)(
N
n
) .
Hypergeometric distribution draws the probability of getting k items with a feature in n draws
without replacement, from totally N items, K of which with that feature. We are mostly interested
in the tail bound of Hypergeometric distribution.
Lemma 1 ( [8, 17]). Let X ∼ H(N,K, n) and p = K/N , then we have the following:
Pr[X ≤ (p− t)n] ≤ exp(−nD(p− t‖p)) ≤ exp(−2nt2), 0 < t < p
Pr[X ≥ (p+ t)n] ≤ exp(−nD(p+ t‖p)) ≤ exp(−2nt2), 0 < t < 1− p
where D(·‖·) stands for the Kullback-Leibler divergence with input real numbers naturally generalized
to probability distributions, i.e. D(a‖b) := a · ln (a/b) + (1− a) · ln ((1− a)/(1− b)), for a, b ∈ (0, 1).
For 0 < a < b < c < 1, the naturally generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence satisfies D(a‖b) <
D(a‖c), D(c‖b) < D(c‖a), D(b‖a) < D(c‖a), D(b‖c) < D(a‖c).
Stirling’s formula. Stirling’s formula provides good estimation of factorial terms. Specifically, we will
use the following version.
Lemma 2 ( [26]). For any integer n ≥ 1, we have √2pi · e−nnn+ 12 < n! < e1−nnn+ 12 .
Block designs. A block design is a particular combinatorial design consisting of a set and a family of
subsets (called blocks) whose arrangements satisfy generalized concepts of balance and symmetry.
Definition 1 (Block design, from [28]). Let n, k, λ and r be positive integers such that n > k ≥ r.
A block design (S,A) is called an r-(n, k, λ)-design if |S| = n and A is a family of k-element subsets
of S (called blocks), such that every r-element subset of S is contained in exactly λ blocks in A.
In this work we mainly consider designs with λ = 1, and hence A cannot contain duplicate blocks.
Corollary 1. In a r-(n, k, λ)-design, the number of blocks is m = λ
(
n
r
)/(
k
r
)
.
Corollary 2. Suppose (S,A) is an r-(n, k, λ)-design. Then for any 1 ≤ t ≤ r, (S,A) is also a
t-(n, k, λt)-design, for λt = λ ·
(
n−t
r−t
)
/
(
k−t
r−t
)
.
Corollary 3. Suppose (S,A) is an r-(n, k, λ)-design. Then for any Z ⊆ S with size |Z| = t ≤ r,
(S − Z, {A− Z : Z ⊆ A ∈ A}) is a (r − t)-(n− t, k − t, λ)-design.
Furthermore, we remark that although non-trivial block designs exist universally by [28], only
very few such designs are explicitly constructed.
3 Model
In this work we consider the decentralized custody scheme without relying on any trusted party. More
specifically, we investigate the feasibility that n participants (a.k.a. n nodes) S = {1, 2, · · · , n} jointly
provide the custody service, such that the security is guaranteed as long as the number of corrupted
participants is bounded by a fraction of n, e.g. the adversary cannot corrupt more than n/3 nodes
simultaneously. This assumption of existence of an honest majority is much milder than assuming a
single party trusted by everyone, and hence it likely leads to better security guarantee in practice.
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Furthermore, we consider the security of the custody scheme in a game-theoretic sense: the adver-
sary may corrupt multiple nodes, but he will not launch an attack if the profit does not exceed the
cost of launching such an attack. In other words, misbehavior of adversary nodes is not considered
as breaking the security as long as the resultant damage is recoverable. To increase the cost of attack
and compensate potential loss caused by attacks, we require every custodian in our scheme to provide
a security deposit, which will be confiscated and used for compensation in case of misbehavior. Thus,
no rational adversary would ever launch an attack if the security deposit outweighs the revenue of a
successful attack.
A trivial but useless solution. In the most trivial solution, the asset under custody can only
be moved when approved by all custodians or at least a majority of them. However, getting such
an approval becomes expensive and even infeasible in practice as n grows, especially when honest
participants may go off-line (as in the sleepy model [22]), which renders the trivial scheme useless.
Although the above solution is not satisfiable, it does provide enlightening ideas for designing a
better custody scheme. The threshold authorization scheme guarantees that the adversary cannot
move any asset under custody if he does not control enough many nodes. In a more general view,
this is a particular case of game-theoretically secure schemes where the adversary’s security deposit
outweighs his revenue of launching an attack when the adversary has bounded power. As long as this
property is satisfied the custody scheme should be secure in the game-theoretic sense.
In particular, the following toy example shows feasibility of implementing our idea with multiple
subsets of S as custodian groups, i.e. each subset of S only controls a fraction of the total asset under
custody.
Example 1 (Toy example). Consider the case when n = 5, total asset under custody is 10, and
total security deposit is 6× 5 = 30. Let each of the (53) = 10 triads of S form a custodian group, and
assign the asset under custody and the security deposit equally to every group, i.e. each custodian
group controls 4 units. If the asset controlled by each custodian group can be moved with approval
of 2 out of 3 members in that group, then an adversary controlling 2 nodes is able to corrupt exactly
3 custodian groups. However, by controlling 3 groups the adversary can only move 4× 3 = 12 units,
which is no more than the security deposit of adversary nodes, which is also 12. Thus the custody
scheme for n = 5 is secure against adversaries controlling no more than two nodes.
In what follows, we will formalize the model of decentralized custody scheme with asset distributed
among custodian groups.
Let S = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of all nodes, and let A denote the custodian group assignment,
which is a family of m subsets of S. We emphasize that these subsets do not have to be disjoint. In
fact, it is imperative to use overlapping subsets in any meaningful solution.
In this work we focus on the symmetric setting where every node provides the same amount of
security deposit and every group in A is of the same size k. We let a universal parameter µ ∈ [1/2, 1)
denote the authentication threshold for every single custodian group, i.e. with approval of strictly
above µk group members the asset controlled by that group can be settled arbitrarily. In particular,
our discussion mainly focuses on µ = 1/2 and µ = 2/3, corresponding to authentication with simple
majority, and greater than 2/3 majority respectively. 3 For simplicity we let r = dµk + e denote the
smallest integer greater than µk, and hence the authentication of every custodian group is essentially
an r-of-k threshold signature scheme.
We represent the adversary power with γ ∈ (0, 1), which refers to the fraction of corrupted nodes
in S. Specifically, we let s = bγnc denote the number of corrupted nodes in S. For succinctness we
slightly abuse the notation and assume that γn is always an integer, i.e. s = γn ∈ N. The adversary
is allowed to adaptively select corrupted nodes and then get all information and full control of those
nodes thereafter, as long as the number of corrupted node does not exceed s. In case a group in
A contains ≥ r corrupted nodes, we say that group is corrupted. Furthermore, we remark that the
adversary has reasonably bounded computing power, so that he cannot break cryptographic primitives
such as digital signatures.
3 µ ≥ 1/2 is the necessary and sufficient condition for Byzantine agreement under synchrony, i.e. when all
members are well-connected [18]. µ ≥ 2/3 is necessary and sufficient for Byzantine agreement under partial
synchrony or asynchrony even with digital signatures [23]. We further remark that smaller µ implies less
security but better liveness, e.g. when µ→ 1 even a single corrupted member is able to block a custodian
group. However, the discussion of liveness is beyond the scope of this work.
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Table 1. The efficiency factor of the custodian assignment as in Example 1
Parameters \ Adversary power (γ) γ = 1/5 γ = 2/5 γ = 3/5 γ = 4/5
Corrupted nodes (s) 1 2 3 4
Corrupted custodian groups (f(γ;A, µ)) 0 3 7 10
Efficiency factor (η) ∞ 1/3 −1/7 −1/5
The authentication threshold is realized as r = 2 and µ = 1/2 (in this example equivalent to have
µ ∈ [1/3, 2/3)). For γ = 1/5 and γ = 2/5, the scheme is secure with η =∞ and η = 1/3
respectively. For γ ≥ 3/5 the scheme is insecure and η ≤ 0.
Given a custodian scheme with group assignment A and authentication threshold µ, together with
γ for the bound of adversary power, we use the function f(γ;A, µ) to denote the maximal number of
groups that may be corrupted by an adversary controlling up to s = γn nodes (although it is indeed
NP-hard to find the optimal attacking strategy in general, as discussed in Section 6). Formally,
f(γ;A, µ) := max
B⊆S:|B|=γn
∣∣{A ∈ A ∣∣ |A ∩B| ≥ µk}∣∣. (1)
From f(γ;A, µ) we define the security of this specific custody scheme as follows:
Definition 2 (Security of Custody Schemes). For a custody scheme with assignment A of m
groups and parameters µ, γ as above, we say that the custody scheme is γ-reliable if
f(γ;A, µ) ≤ γ ·m.
Furthermore, the scheme is called secure against γ-adversary (or simply secure) if it is γ′-reliable for
every γ′ ∈ [0, γ].
The above definition of security guarantees that by controlling γn nodes, the adversary is only
able to corrupt f(γ;A, µ) custodian groups. Therefore, by launching an attack the adversary is able
to seize the funds of f(γ;A, µ) custodian groups, at the cost of losing the security deposit of γn
corrupted nodes. The custody scheme is secure as long as the asset under custody of f(γ;A, µ)
groups is bounded by the security deposit of γn nodes, which indeed requires f(γ;A, µ) ≤ γm since
the deposit of γn nodes can be as much as asset under custody of γm groups.
Note that the gap between f(γ;A, µ) and γm corresponds to the ratio of external asset that can
be securely held compared to security deposit, which should be as large as possible. For example,
f(γ;A, µ) = γm implies that the custody scheme is only capable of securely holding the security
deposit of its members but cannot provide custody service for any external users. To describe the
ability of securely holding exterior assets, we introduce the notion of efficiency factor as in the following
definition:
Definition 3 (Efficiency factor). Given a custody scheme with A,m, µ and γ defined as above,
the efficiency factor of this scheme, denoted by η, is defined as:
η :=
γm− f(γ;A, µ)
f(γ;A, µ) .
It is immediate to verify that η ≥ 0 for any custody scheme secure as in Definition 2. This factor
η indeed equals to the maximal ratio of capable exterior assets to pledged assets that the underlying
custody scheme is able to handle. For example, η = 1 means the system is secure when the total value
of exterior assets is no more than total pledged security deposit.
Putting into our formal definition, the trivial solution has only one custodian group (i.e. m = 1,
k = n), and η =∞ for γ ≤ µ and η < 0 for γ > µ; the custody scheme in Example 1 has its efficiency
factor η changing according to the adversary power γ as summarized in the following table.
From the formalization of our decentralized custody scheme, it is clear that the custodian group
assignment A is the core of the whole custody scheme. In particular, for every specific group as-
signment A and fixed constant µ (say, µ ∈ {1/2, 2/3}), the parameters n,m, k are already specified
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in A, and the maximal number of corrupted groups and the efficiency factor η are functions solely
depending on the adversary power γ.
Therefore, in the rest of this article we will focus on construction and analysis of custodian group
assignments. More specifically, we want the group assignment to support a decentralized custody
scheme with the efficiency factor η as large as possible for adversary power γ bounded within a
reasonable range (e.g. γ < 1/3 or so), and at the same time the group assignment A should have
large n (e.g. over a thousand) and small m and k (e.g. ideally bounded by one hundred).
3.1 Limitation and Impossibilities
First we remark that the reliability and efficiency factor of an assignment A is not necessarily mono-
tone. That is, there exists γa > γb such that the custody scheme induced by some A is γa-reliable
but not γb-reliable, as exhibited in the following example.
Example 2. Consider the case S = {1, 2, · · · , 10}, µ = 2/3, and the assignment scheme A =
{(1, 2, 3, 4, 5), (6, 7, 8, 9, 10)}. For γ = 2/5, the system is not γ-reliable since an adversary with 4
corrupted nodes may corrupt one group and get half of the total security deposit. However, when
γ = 3/5, the system is γ-reliable since the adversary controls at most one group with more than half
of the total deposit.
We also remark that in general a decentralized custody scheme based on group assignments cannot
be γ-reliable for all γ unless r = k. Since when r < k, by corrupting n− 1 nodes the adversary is able
to corrupt all custodian groups and hence get full control of the whole system.
4 Constructions of Group Assignments
In this section, we propose three types of group assignments and analyze the performance of resultant
custody schemes. We also provide empirical analysis of these schemes with concrete numbers for a
better understanding.
4.1 Type 1: Symmetric Design
Construction 1. Given n and k, let Aall be a family consisting of all size-k subsets of S as custodian
groups, i.e. Aall is an assignment with m =
(
n
k
)
groups where each group has k nodes. Then for every
authentication threshold µ, a custody scheme can be constructed from Aall.
Since all nodes are symmetric in Aall, it immediately follows that the number of corrupted groups
in the above custody scheme only depends on the number of corrupted nodes. Thus it suffices to
consider the adversary corrupts any set of γn nodes, and the number of corrupted groups can be
calculated as follows:
f(γ;A, µ) =
∑
r≤t≤k
(
γn
t
)(
n− γn
k − t
)
=
(
n
k
)
·
k∑
t=r
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
)(
n
k
) . (2)
By Definition 2 and recalling m =
(
n
k
)
, the custody scheme is γ-reliable if and only if:
γ ≥ f(γ;A, µ)
m
=
k∑
t=r
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
)(
n
k
) ,
and the efficiency factor η turns out:
η =
γm− f(γ;A, µ)
f(γ;A, µ) =
γ
(
n
k
)∑k
t=r
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
) − 1.
The reliability of Aall against adversary corrupting exactly γn nodes naturally implies to security
against adversary corrupting ≤ γn nodes for reasonable γ, as proved in the following lemma. For
typical choice of µ ≥ 1/2 and γ < 1 − k/n, the translation from reliability to security holds for
γ < µ− 12(k−1) .
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Lemma 3. Suppose Aall is a group assignment following Construction 1 with parameters n and
k. If the custody scheme derived from Aall and any authentication threshold µ is γ-reliable and
γ ≤ min
{
µk−1
k−1 +
1
n , 1− kn
}
, then it is secure against γ-adversary (i.e. γ′-reliable for every γ′ ≤ γ).
The proof of Lemma 3 is obtained by comparing η for adversary corrupting s nodes and s − 1
nodes. See Appendix A.1 for the complete proof.
Based on Lemma 3, we prove that Aall is secure for γ close to 1/2 and appropriately large k.
Theorem 1. When µ ≥ 1/2, k ≥ 10 and n ≥ 2k, the custody scheme derived from Aall and µ is
secure against γall-adversary, for γall defined as follows:
γall :=
1
2
− 1√
k
− 1
2k
.
Proof (Sketch). We first show that when n ≥ 2k and k ≥ 10, the system is reliable for γ ∈ [ 12 − 1√k −
1
k ,
1
2 − 1√k −
1
2k ]. In fact, recall that the system is secure as long as
γ ≥
∑
µk<t≤k
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
)(
n
k
) ,
and by the tail bound of hypergeometric distribution, it is sufficient with
γ ≥ exp(−kD(µ‖γ)) ≥
∑
µk<t≤k
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
)(
n
k
) .
By the property of Kullbeck-Leibler divergence on two real numbers, we can obtain the above if
we have
γ ≥ (4γ(1− γ))k/2 ≥ exp(−kD(µ‖γ)),
which establishes as long as γ ∈ [ 12 − 1√k −
1
k ,
1
2 − 1√k −
1
2k ], µ > 1/2, k ≥ 10 and n ≥ 2k.
Lemma 3 shows that as long as the system is reliable w.r.t γ < 12− 1√k−
1
2k < min
{
µk−1
k−1 +
1
n , 1− kn
}
,
then the system is secure against γ-adversary. Therefore, we finish the proof. The complete proof of
this theorem is deferred to Appendix A.2. uunionsq
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. The efficiency factor η versus the corrupted fraction γ for Aall as in Construction 1. In particular,
η < 0 if the custody scheme is not secure for corresponding γ.
Fig. 1 depicts the relation between efficiency factor η and adversary corrupted fraction γ, for
n ∈ {20, 50}, k ∈ {6, 7}, and µ ∈ {1/2, 2/3}. From this figure we can see that with fixed n, k and µ,
the efficiency factor η decreases as γ grows. Further, for combinations of reasonably large n and k,
the efficiency factor η can be more than 10 while γ is roughly 1/3. For instance, when n = 20, k = 6
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and µ = 2/3 as in Fig. 1(b), there is m =
(
20
6
)
= 38, 760 and the efficiency factor η = 21.1486 against
adversary with power γ = 2/5.
Fig. 2 depicts the behavior of the efficiency factor η versus the custodian group size k, for n ∈
{20, 50}, µ ∈ {1/2, 2/3} and γ ∈ {1/5, 1/4, 1/3}. The figure shows in general η increases with k in
custody schemes induced by Aall. The sawteeth appears on the curves because of the rounding of r
and s, i.e. the authentication threshold and the number of corrupted nodes.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2. The efficiency factor η versus the custodian group size k for Aall as in Construction 1. Blank points
on the right side refer to η =∞ when adversary cannot corrupt even a single group.
Finally we remark that the construction of Aall by itself is mainly a theoretical result. Because the
size of such group assignment m =
(
n
k
)
grows too fast and hence n and k must be severely bounded
in practice, e.g. n ∼ 20 and k ∼ 5. Otherwise it would be too expensive or even impossible to manage
the custody scheme consisting of m custodian groups. A solution to mitigate the above issues is by
random sampling, as exhibited in Section 5.
4.2 Type 2: Block Design
In this section, we consider group assignment schemes induced by block designs (see Section 2 for
necessary preliminaries). In fact, block designs naturally extend Construction 1, in the sense that
Aall is a degenerated block design with λ = 1. In what follows, a “block” in the block design is also
called a “group” in the group assignment scheme.
The following lemma shows the effectiveness of block designs:
Lemma 4. For every r-(n, k, λ)-design and µ = r/k, the induced custody scheme is γ-reliable with
efficiency factor η lower bounded as follows:
η ≥ s
n
·
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)/min{(s
r
)
,
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)} − 1.
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The above lemma holds since with s = γn corrupted nodes, the adversary controls at most λ · (sr)
custodian groups out of m = λ · (nr)/(kr) groups in total. Fig. 3 shows the lower bound of η obtained
by Lemma 4 versus the adversary’s power γ for different block designs with µ = (r − 1)/k.
Fig. 3. The lower bound on η by Lemma 4, versus the corrupted fraction γ, when µ = (r − 1)/k. All four
designs shown in this figure have explicit constructions [28]. η < 0 if the custody scheme is not secure for
corresponding γ.
Resembling what we do in Section 4.1, we prove that block designs are always reliable with
properly small γ.
Theorem 2. Let s = γn be the number of corrupted nodes and µ = (r − 1)/k. Suppose we have
µ ≥ 1/2, r > µk ≥ 2 and n ≥ 3k − 3. The custody scheme induced by an r-(n, k, λ)-design is γ-
reliable as long as
(
s
r
) ≤ (nr)/(kr) and s ≤ nkµ 1r−1 + r − 1. Furthermore, the reliability is monotone
in γ and hence it immediately translates to security against adversary corrupting up to γn nodes.
Proof (Sketch). We consider the lower bound of the efficiency factor η given by Lemma 4. Under the
condition that
(
s
r
) ≤ (nr)/(kr) , the system is reliable when
s
n
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)(
s
r
) ≥ 1.
A key observation is that,
s
n
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)(
s
r
) = r−1∏
t=1
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) ·
r
k
>
r−1∏
t=1
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) · µ.
With the above observation we conclude the following holds for any 1 ≤ t ≤ r − 1,
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) ≥ µ
− 1r−1 .
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Therefore,
s
n
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)(
s
r
) > r−1∏
t=1
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) · µ ≥
(
µ−
1
r−1
)r−1
· µ = 1.
The full proof of the theorem is deferred to Appendix A.3. uunionsq
Theorem 2 guarantees the security of the custody scheme for proper γ. Although Lemma 4 does
not provide an ideal lower bound estimation for large γ (see Fig. 3), we still manage to achieve
some satisfying results. In particular, using the custody scheme induced from the 5-(24, 8, 1)-design
with m = 759 custodian groups with µ = 1/2, the efficiency factor η ≥ 30.6250 for γ = 1/4. This
significantly outperforms the symmetric design Aall, which has m = 38, 760 and η = 16.9444 when
n = 20, k = 6, µ = 1/2 and γ = 1/4 (see Fig. 1(a)).
4.3 Type 3: Polynomial Design
In this section, we propose another way to construct group assignments using polynomial-based
combinatorial designs.
Construction 2. For a prime k and fixed positive integer d < k, let S = {(a, b) | a, b ∈ Z/kZ} be
the set of n = k2 elements in (Z/kZ)2. The polynomial design of group assignment Apoly is a family
of m = kd subsets of S defined as follows:
Apoly := {Ap | p is degree-d monic polynomials over Z/kZ} , (3)
where Ap := {(0, p(0)), (1, p(1)), · · · , (k − 1, p(k − 1))}.
For every authentication threshold µ, a custody scheme can be constructed from Apoly.
It is easy to verify that Apoly consists of m distinct groups, and the intersection of any two distinct
groups in Apoly is bounded by d, following the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra.
∀Ap, Aq ∈ Apoly ∧Ap 6= Aq =⇒ |Ap ∩Aq| < d. (4)
Hence, we lower bound the efficiency factor of custody schemes in Construction 2 as below.
Lemma 5. The efficiency factor η for Apoly as in Construction 2 is lower bounded as follows:
η ≥ γ1−d ·
(
r
d
)/(k
d
)
− 1.
We say a subset of S is first-entry-unrepeated if all nodes in the subset are with different first
entry. Let M denote the set of corrupted nodes, then the number of size-d first-entry-unrepeated
subsets ofM is upper bounded by (kd)(s/k)d. By (4), every size-d first-entry-unrepeated subset ofM
appears in at most one corrupted group. On the other hand, every corrupted group contains at least
r corrupted nodes all with different first entry, and hence ≥ (rd) size-d first-entry-unrepeated subsets.
For the full proof of Lemma 5, please see Appendix A.4.
In the following theorem, we analyze the security of custody schemes in Construction 2.
Theorem 3. Let d = νk, then the custody scheme derived from Apoly is secure against γpoly-
adversary for γpoly defined as:
γpoly :=
(
2pi
ed+2
√
(1− ν)µ
µ− ν
(
µµ
(µ− ν)µ−ν
)k) 1d−1
.
Proof (Sketch). By Lemma 5, the custody scheme remains reliable as long as
γd−1 ≤
(
r
d
)/(
k
d
)
.
The binomial term can be lower bounded using Stirling’s formula, which turns out:(
r
d
)/(
k
d
)
≥ 2pi
ed+2
√
(1− ν)µ
µ− ν
(
µµ
(µ− ν)µ−ν
)k
.
We prove the theorem by letting the right hand side of above formula no less than γd−1. The full
proof with complete calculation is deferred to Appendix A.5. uunionsq
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4. The lower bound for the efficiency factor η (by Lemma 5) versus the corrupted fraction γ, for µ = 1/2
and µ = 2/3. Recall that n = k2 in Apoly and η < 0 if the custody scheme is not secure for corresponding γ.
As an instance of Theorem 3, the custody scheme with n = 49, k = 7, d = 3 and µ = 1/2 is secure
against adversary with power γ ≤ 0.1673, or equivalently the number of compromised nodes s ≤ 8.
Fig. 4 depicts the relation between the lower bound of η by Lemma 5 and the adversary corruption
factor γ, for µ ∈ {1/2, 2/3} and n, k, d as shown in the figure. It is easy to see that η increases as n, k
and d become larger. For specific choices we get η ≥ 20.9094 against adversary with γ = 3/11, when
µ = 2/3 and Apoly is parameterized by n = 121, k = 11 and d = 5. Furthermore, we remark that
the efficiency factor η increases rapidly when γ decreases. For instance, η ≥ 109.9166 when reducing
γ from 3/11 to 2/11 in the above example. That is, the efficiency factor increased by 5 times at the
cost of relaxing the tolerance of 33 corrupted nodes down to 22.
5 Compact Group Assignments via Random Sampling
We notice that in previous constructions a group assignment A may contain too many custodian
groups which makes the induced custody scheme impossible to manage in practice. To mitigate this
problem, we propose a randomized sampling technique to construct compact custody schemes with
a small number of custodian groups sampled from A as representative.
Given a group assignment A consisting of m groups, as well as a sampling rate β ∈ (0, 1), we
uniformly sample a subset of βm elements from A as the new assignment A′, and then construct
custody scheme based on A′. This sampling process does not change the authentication threshold µ.
In what follows we analyze the efficiency of A′ comparing to A.
For a given corrupted fraction γ, let ξ be a function of γ defined as follows:
ξ := − (γ log γ + (1− γ) log(1− γ)) . (5)
The efficiency factor of custody scheme induced byA′ is lower bounded as in the following theorem:
Theorem 4. Let A and ξ be defined as above, and suppose the corrupted fraction γ satisfies nγ(1−
γ) ≥ 1 (which is trivial if n > 4 and γn ≥ 2). Let A′ be the group assignment uniformly sampled
from A with β ∈ (0, 1), and let η′ denote the efficiency factor of A′. Then, for arbitrary c ≥ 0,
with probability at least 1 − e2pi exp(−cnξ) the following lower bound for η′ holds against the same
γ-adversary:
η′ ≥ γ(η + 1) ·
√
βm
γ · √βm+ (η + 1) ·√(1 + c)nξ/2 − 1.
Proof (Sketch). The theorem is proved in two steps.
First, we bound the probability that a specific attacking strategy corrupts more than βf(γ;A, µ)+√
nξ · βm in the new assignment A′, where the probability is taken over the random sampling process
of A′. In particular, for an adversary with a fixed corruption set, let X := X(A′) be the random vari-
able denoting the number of groups in A′ corrupted by that adversary. Then, with the hypergeometric
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tail bound, we lower bound X as follows:
Pr
A′
[
X ≥ β · f(γ;A, µ) +
√(
1 + c
2
)
· nξ · βm
]
≤ exp(−(1 + c)nξ).
Then, the following inequality holds by applying a union bound on all possible
(
n
γn
)
corrupting
sets:
Pr
A′
[
f(γ;A′, µ) ≥ β · f(γ;A, µ) +
√(
1 + c
2
)
· nξ · βm
]
≤ e
2pi
exp(−cnξ).
Therefore, with probability at least 1− e2pi exp(−cnξ) there is f(γ;A′, µ) ≤ βf(γ;A, µ)+
√
nξ · βm,
from which we conclude the following bound and finish the proof.
η′ ≥ γ(η + 1) ·
√
βm
γ · √βm+ (η + 1) ·√(1 + c)nξ/2 − 1,
The complete proof is deferred to Appendix A.6. uunionsq
The following corollary follows Theorem 4 immediately.
Corollary 4. Let A be a group assignment with efficiency factor η against adversary controlling s
corrupted nodes. Let A′ be the sampled group assignment from A with (η + 1)nξ/γ2 groups. Then,
with probability at least 1 − e2pi exp(−nξ), the custody scheme induced by A′ has efficiency factor
η′ ≥ √η + 1− 2 against same adversary with s corrupted nodes.
To illustrate the effect of the above sampling technique, we present the following two examples
with concrete numbers.
Example 3 (Sampling from symmetric designs). Consider Aall with n = 1, 000 and k = 25.
Let µ = 2/3 and s = 428 (or γ = 0.428). If we uniformly at random sample 88, 695 groups from
Aall to form A′, then by Theorem 4, the sampled custody scheme has efficiency factor η′ ≥ 5 with
probability 1 − e2pi ≈ 0.5674 over the random sampling process. Further, if s = 388 (or γ = 0.388)
and m′ = 323, 825 groups, then η′ ≥ 10 with probability 1− e2pi .
Example 4 (Sampling from polynomial designs). Consider Apoly with n = 961, k = 31 and
d = 12. Let µ = 2/3 and s = 314 (or γ ≈ 0.3267). If we uniformly at random draw 138, 767 groups
from Apoly to form A′, then by Theorem 4 there is η′ ≥ 5 with probability 1− e2pi ≈ 0.5674 over the
random sampling process. Further, if s = 285 (or γ ≈ 0.2966) and sampling m′ = 481, 017 groups,
then η′ ≥ 10 with probability 1− e2pi .
6 Hardness Results
In this section, we consider the hardness issue of finding the best corrupting scheme. In general, with
a common group assignment scheme A, it is hard for the polynomial-time adversary to figure out the
best attack strategy.
Theorem 5. Take k and r as predetermined constants, then, with the group assignment scheme A
which includes n nodes and the group number m be within a polynomial in n, and the adversary
controlling s := γn = nΩ(1) nodes, we have the following results:
– When 1 ≤ r < k, it is NP-hard to find the optimal attacking strategy.
– When r = k, under the Small Set Expansion Conjecture [24], it is NP-hard to find the optimal
attacking strategy.
Proof (Sketch). To show the NP-hardness of the problem with 1 < r < k, we consider the MAX s-VC
problem; for the case of r = k, we consider the fixed cost minimum edge cover (FCMC) problem
defined in [14]. For the details on the reduction step, please refer to Appendix A.7. uunionsq
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Theorem 5 shows that generally, it is hard for the computationally bounded adversary to figure
out the best attacking strategy. Nevertheless, there is a deterministic algorithm for the adversary to
figure out a strategy which corrupts at least an average amount of groups. Let κ := Pr[H(n, s, k) ≥ r],
recall that κm is the expected amount of groups the adversary can corrupt when the γn corrupted
nodes are chosen uniformly at random. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Let κ be defined as above. Suppose computing each binomial coefficient takes time O(1).
Then there is a deterministic algorithm that gives an attacking strategy which corrupts at least κm
groups, running in time O(kmn).
Proof (Sketch). Specifically, we construct an O(kmn) deterministic algorithm (see Algorithm 1) and
prove that the algorithm always return a corrupting strategy no beneath the average. Specifically, in
each step, we judge whether or not to corrupt a node conditioning on previous choices. We prove that
after each step before the algorithm ends, the conditional expectation of the number of corrupted
groups is no less than average given previous decisions. Hence the algorithm always returns a solution
no worse than average. For the construction of the algorithm and full proof, please see Appendix A.8.
uunionsq
7 Summary and Discussion
In this work we propose a framework of decentralized custody schemes based on overlapping group
assignments. This custody scheme allows better efficiency as well as stronger liveness, and its security
is guaranteed in a game-theoretic sense without resorting to any central authorities or trusted party.
We believe such decentralized custody scheme will find applications in digital finance as well as DeFi
on blockchains.
Future improvements of this work include explicit constructions of compact assignments with
much less custodian groups, efficient approximation algorithms for estimating the actual efficiency
factor of a given custody scheme in our framework, and more rigorous analysis of liveness guarantee
as well as the tradeoff between liveness and security.
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Appendix A Proof of lemmas and theorems
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For simplicity, let s := γn be the number of nodes that the adversary corrupts, and
ηs =
s
n
(
n
k
)∑k
t=r
(
s
t
)(
n−s
k−t
) − 1
be the efficiency factor of the system in this case. We will compare ηs with ηs−1. Specifically, we
compare every corresponding pair of terms in the sum. For any r ≤ t ≤ k, we have
s ·
(
n
k
)(
s
t
)(
n−s
k−t
)/(s− 1) · (nk)(s−1
t
)(
n−s+1
k−t
) = (n− s− k + t)!(s− t)!
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
/
(n− s− k + t+ 1)!(s− t− 1)!
(n− s+ 1)!(s− 2)!
=
(s− t)(n− s+ 1)
(n− s− k + t+ 1)(s− 1) ,
and
(s− t)(n− s+ 1)
(n− s− k + t+ 1)(s− 1) ≤ 1
⇐⇒ (s− t)(n− s+ 1) ≤ (n− s− k + t+ 1)(s− 1)
⇐⇒ s(k − 1) ≤ (t− 1)n+ k − 1
⇐= s ≤ µk − 1
k − 1 n+ 1.
Here, the second inequality is due to s ≤ n−k, while the fourth inequality is due to t > µk. The result
implies that ηs ≤ ηs−1 always holds when s ≤ µk−1k−1 n+ 1, which proves the lemma as s = γn. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We will first prove that the system is reliable when k ≥ 10 and 12 − 1√k −
1
k ≤ γ ≤ 12 − 1√k −
1
2k ,
and combine the result with Lemma 3 to prove the theorem. Note here that as n ≥ 2k, there must
exist some γ in [ 12 − 1√k −
1
k ,
1
2 − 1√k −
1
2k ] such that γn is an integer.
Recall that the system is γ-reliable as long as
γ ≥
∑
µk<t≤k
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
)(
n
k
) ,
by the tail bound of hypergeometric distribution (see Section 2) and that γ < µ, we have∑
µk<t≤k
(
γn
t
)(
n−γn
k−t
)(
n
k
) ≤ exp(−kD(µ‖γ)) ≤ (4γ(1− γ))k/2 .
The last equality is due to
D(µ‖γ) > D(1
2
‖γ) = 1
2
ln
1
2γ
+
1
2
ln
1
2(1− γ) =
1
2
ln
1
4γ(1− γ) ,
as γ < 1/2 < µ. (See Section 2.)
When 12 − 1√k −
1
k ≤ γ ≤ 12 − 1√k −
1
2k and k ≥ 10,
(4γ(1− γ))k/2 ≤
1− 4(2√k + 1
2k
)2k/2
≤ exp
(
− (2
√
k + 1)2
2k
)
≤ 1
2
− 1√
k
− 1
k
≤ γ,
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The second inequality is due to (1 − 1/x)x ≤ 1/e for any x > 1. This implies that the system is
γ-reliable when 12 − 1√k −
1
k ≤ γ ≤ 12 − 1√k −
1
2k . Note that when µ > 1/2, n ≥ 2k and k ≥ 10,
1
2
− 1√
k
− 1
2k
≤ 1
2
− 1
2(k − 1) +
1
n
< min
(
µk − 1
k − 1 +
1
n
, 1− k
n
)
,
with Lemma 3, the result is reached. uunionsq
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. When
(
s
r
) ≤ (nr)/(kr) , by Lemma 4, we have the following lower bound on the efficiency factor
of the system:
η ≥ s
n
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)(
s
r
) − 1.
For the system to be reliable, it is sufficient if we have
s
n
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)(
s
r
) ≥ 1.
Note that
s
n
(
n
r
)(
k
r
)(
s
r
) = s
n
n!(s− r)!
(n− r)!s!
/(
k
r
)
=
n− 1
s− 1 · · · · ·
n− r + 1
s− r + 1 ·
r
k
· r − 1
k − 1 · · · · ·
1
k − r + 1
=
r−1∏
t=1
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) ·
r
k
>
r−1∏
t=1
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) · µ.
which is satisfied if we have
(n− t)(r − t)
(s− t)(k − t) ≥ µ
− 1r−1 , ∀1 ≤ t ≤ r − 1.
Let c := µ−
1
r−1 > 1, the above condition is equivalent to
c(s− t)(k − t)− (n− t)(r − t) ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ t ≤ r − 1,
and by the property of quadratic functions, we only need to work on the case of t = 1 and t = r− 1.
When t = 1, the condition becomes
s− 1
n− 1 ≤
r − 1
c(k − 1) ,
note that s−1n−1 <
s
n = γ. Hence it is sufficient with γ ≤ r−1c(k−1) . When µ ≥ 1/2, r ≥ 2 and n ≥ 3k − 3,
we have c = µ−
1
r−1 < 3/2. Therefore,
s ≤ n
c · k + r − 1 =⇒ γ ≤
1
c · k +
r − 1
n
=⇒ γ ≤ 1
c(k − 1) +
2(r − 2)
n
=⇒ γ ≤ 1
c(k − 1) +
2(r − 2)
3(k − 1)
=⇒ γ ≤ 1
c(k − 1) +
r − 2
c(k − 1)
=⇒ γ ≤ r − 1
c(k − 1) .
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When t = r − 1, the condition becomes
n− r + 1 ≥ c(s− r + 1)(k − r + 1),
or
s ≤ n− r + 1
c(k − r + 1) + r − 1.
which establishes when s ≤ nck + r − 1, as nk ≤ n−r+1k−r+1 . uunionsq
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We say a subset of S is first-entry-unrepeated if all nodes in the subset are with different first
entry. Now that the adversary corrupts s nodes in total. Let si be the number of corrupted nodes with
first entry i. We have s = s0 + s1 + · · · sk−1. Therefore, the number of size-d first-entry-unrepeated
subsets that is totally corrupted is ∑
0≤i1<i2···<id≤k−1
si1si2 · · · sid .
To give an upper bound on the above formula, we extend the problem to the case where s0, s1, · · · , sk−1
are multiples of 1/k. (The original problem is when s0, s1, · · · , sk−1 are all integers.) For any two in-
dices u, v, suppose sv − su ≥ 2/k, note that∑
0≤i1<i2···<id≤k−1
si1si2 · · · sid
= susv
∑
0≤i1<i2···<id−2≤k−1
{i1,i2,··· ,id−2}∩{u,v}=∅
si1si2 · · · sid−2 + (su + sv)
∑
0≤i1<i2···<id−2≤k−1
{i1,i2,··· ,id−1}∩{u,v}=∅
si1si2 · · · sid−1
+
∑
0≤i1<i2···<id≤k−1
{i1,i2,··· ,id}∩{u,v}=∅
si1si2 · · · sid .
Hence, the sum is strictly increase by substituting su with s
′
u = su+1/k and sv with s
′
v = sv−1/k.
Therefore, the sum reaches a maximum with s0 = s1 = · · · = sk−1 = s/k in the generalized case,
which implies that with s0, s1, · · · , sk−1 all integers, we have∑
0≤i1<i2···<id≤k−1
si1si2 · · · sid ≤
(
k
d
)( s
k
)d
,
or that the number of size-d first-entry-unrepeated subsets that is totally controlled by the adversary
is upper bounded by
(
k
d
)
(s/k)d. Let M denote the set of corrupted nodes. By (4), every size-d first-
entry-unrepeated subset of M appears in at most one corrupted group. On the other hand, every
corrupted group contains at least r corrupted nodes all with different first entry, and hence ≥ (rd)
size-d first-entry-unrepeated subsets. Consequently, the number of corrupted groups is upper bounded
by
(kd)s
d
(rd)kd
, and the efficiency factor η is lower bounded by
η ≥ γ
(
r
d
)
k2d(
k
d
)
sd
− 1 = γ1−d ·
(
r
d
)/(k
d
)
− 1,
as s = γn = γk2.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. As per Lemma 5, it is sufficient if we have
γd−1 ≤
(
r
d
)/(
k
d
)
.
.
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As we have (
r
d
)/(
k
d
)
=
(k − d)!r!
(r − d)!k!
≥ 2pi
e2
(k − d)k−d+ 12 rr+ 12
(r − d)r−d+ 12 kk+ 12
=
2pi
e2
√
(k − d)r
(r − d)k ·
(k − d)k−d
kk
· r
r
(r − d)r−d
=
2pi
e2
√
(k − d)r
(r − d)k ·
1
(1 + d/(k − d))k−d
· r
r
(r − d)r−dkd
2pi
ed+2
√
(1− ν)µ
µ− ν
(
µµ
(µ− ν)µ−ν
)k
,
the theorem is proved by having the last formula no less than γd−1. Here, we use Stirling’s formula
(see Section 2) to estimate the factorial term in the second line. Meanwhile, in the second line from
the bottom, we apply that (1 + 1/x)x < e for all x > 0. uunionsq
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. To show the result, first consider a specific attacking strategy from the adversary who precisely
corrupts γn nodes. We call the strategy M. Denote g(M) be the corrupted groups with strategy M
under the group assignment scheme A. Clearly, g(M) ≤ f(γ;A, µ) by definition.
Now suppose we uniformly draw βm groups from A to obtain A′, and let X be a random variable
indicating the number of corrupted groups in the new scheme A′. By hypergeometric tail bound (see
Section 2), we have
Pr
[
X ≥
(
f(γ;A, µ)
m
+ δ
)
· βm
]
= Pr
[
X ≥
[
g(M)
m
+
(
f(γ;A, µ)− g(M)
m
+ δ
)]
· βm
]
≤ exp
(
−2βm ·
(
f(γ;A, µ)− g(M)
m
+ δ
)2)
≤ exp(−2βm · δ2).
Here, δ > 0 is a parameter to be determined. The probability is over all possible choices of A′. Let
f(γ;A′, µ) denote the maximal number of groups that can be corrupted with γn compromised nodes
in the new scheme A′, by a union bound, we have
Pr [f(γ;A′, µ) ≥ βf(γ;A, µ) + δ · βm] ≤ exp(−2βm · δ2)
(
n
γn
)
.
By Stirling’s formula (see Section 2),(
n
γn
)
=
n!
(γn)!(n− γn)!
≤ e
2pi
nn+
1
2
(γn)γn+
1
2 (n− γn)n−γn+ 12
=
e
2pi
√
1
nγ(1− γ) ·
(
1
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
)n
≤ e
2pi
(
1
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
)n
.
Hence,
Pr[f(γ;A′, µ) ≥ βf(γ;A, µ) + δ · βm] ≤ exp(−2βm · δ2)
(
n
γn
)
≤ e
2pi
exp(−2βm · δ2 + nξ).
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Let βm·δ2 = 1+c2 ·nξ, then w.p. no less than 1− e2pi exp(−cnξ), we have f(γ;A′, µ) ≤ βf(γ;A, µ)+
δ · βm. Under such case, the efficiency factor η′ of A′ with malicious rate γ is lower bounded by
η′ = γ
βm
f(γ;A′, µ) − 1
≥ γ m
f(γ;A, µ) + δ ·m − 1
= γ
m
γm
η+1 + δ ·m
− 1
= γ
η + 1
γ + δ · (η + 1) − 1
=
γ
√
βm(η + 1)
γ
√
βm+
√
(1 + c)nξ/2(η + 1)
− 1.
The third line is due to the definition of η:
η = γ · m
f(γ;A, µ) − 1.
uunionsq
A.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. First of all, it is trivial that the given problem is harder than only to determine the number
of corrupted groups under the best attacking strategy. We only consider the latter in this proof.
Technically, we will work on the two cases, r < k and r = k respectively.
– r < k. We first deal with the case when r = 1. In fact, in this case, when k = 2, then finding the
optimal attacking strategy is naturally equivalent to the MAX s-VC problem in common graphs.
Here, the MAX s-VC problem is to compute the maximum number of edges that s vertices can
cover given a graph of size n. This problem is known to be NP-hard.
When k > 2, the problem is equivalent to the MAX s-VC problem in k-uniform hypergraphs.
Here, a k-uniform hypergraph is a hypergraph in which each edge contains exactly k vertices.
We reduce the MAX s-VC problem in common graphs to this problem. Specifically, consider
a realization of the problem in the graph G = (V,E) with m edges. We transfer G to a k-
uniform hypergraph G′ = (V ′, E′) by adding (k − 2)m vertices to V . Denote these vertices as
v11 , v
2
1 , · · · , vm1 , · · · , v1k−2, v2k−2, · · · , vmk−2. For each edge ei in G, we add vi1, vi2, · · · , vik−2 to ei and
obtain an edge e′i in E
′ with k vertices. Now consider the MAX s-VC solution in G′. Obviously,
there is an optimum which contains no point in V ′ − V , as any point in V ′ − V appears in only
one edge, and substituting a selected point in V ′ − V with an unselected point in the same edge
that belongs to V will cause no loss on the objective function. If all vertices in that edge that
belongs to V ′ − V are selected, we can alternatively pick any non-chosen vertices in V ′ − V , still
with no loss on the goal. Therefore, the modified instance in the k-uniform hypergraph owns the
same objective value with the original problem in common graphs. Note that the reduction step
itself is polynomial as m is a polynomial of n. At the same time, s = (n + (k − 2)m))Ω(1) since
k is a constant and m is within a polynomial of n. Hence, the MAX s-VC problem in k-uniform
hypergraphs is NP-hard as well.
Here, we should mention that the MAX s-VC problem in k-uniform hypergraphs (k ≥ 2) is
indeed a special case of the MAX s-Cover problem, with each element existing in precisely k sets.
The reduction is to deem each vertex as a set, including all edges incident to the vertex. There
is a simple (1 − e−1)-approximation greedy algorithm for the MAX s-Cover problem [10, 16].
Furthermore, it is known that in general, for any  > 0, there is no (1− e−1 − )-approximation
for this problem unless P = NP [11]. Nevertheless, concerning MAX s-VC in common graphs,
there is a (0.75 + δ)-approximation algorithm for some constant δ > 0 [12]. Meanwhile, the MAX
s-VC problem in k-uniform hypergraphs with k ≥ 3 can also be approximated strictly within the
ratio 0.75 [3].
When k > r > 1, the original problem is equivalent to the following problem:
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Problem 1. For a k-uniform hypergraph G = (V,E) where |V | = n, we say an edge is covered
only if at least r vertices incident to the edge is selected. With s vertices, compute the maximal
number of edges that can be covered.
we reduce the problem of finding a MAX (s−r+1)-VC problem in (k−r+1)-uniform hypergraphs
to this problem. Again, consider an instance G = (V,E) of the latter problem. We add (r − 1)
vertices to V , as well as including them in each hyperedge in E to achieve G′ = (V ′, E′), which
is an instance in Problem 1. Consider the optimal solution in this problem. We claim that there
always exists an optimum that concludes the appended (r − 1) vertices, as changing any chosen
vertex in V to a point in V ′−V will never lessen the objective value. Under such optimum, an edge
in G′ is covered if and only if the corresponding edge in G is covered in the MAX (s− r+ 1)-VC
problem in (k− r+ 1)-uniform hypergraph. Therefore, the two instances own the same objective
value in their respective questions. Furthermore, such reduction is polynomial-bounded, which
leads to the NP-hardness of Problem 1.
– r = k. When k = 2, the problem becomes
Problem 2. Given a common graph G = (V,E) where |V | = n and s < n, compute the maximal
number of edges that s vertices can completely cover. Here, an edge is completely covered if and
only if both endpoints are chosen.
Consider a optimal solution C with |C| = s, then the number of edges that are incident with
any vertex in V − C is minimized. Hence, Problem 2 is bidirectional-reducible to the following
problem:
Problem 3. Given a common graph G = (V,E) where |V | = n and s < n, compute the minimal
number of edges that n− s vertices can cover.
Problem 3 is the uniform-weighted case of the fixed cost minimum edge cover (FCMC) problem
defined in [14], which is proved to be NP-hard even to approximate with a factor (2−) under the
Small Set Expansion Conjecture in the same paper. Hence, under such assumption, Problem 2 is
hard to solve. For the case when k > 2, we can reduce Problem 2 with k-uniform hypergraphs to
the corresponding problem with the similar reduction as what we do with Problem 1.
uunionsq
A.8 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We give the algorithm in Algorithm 1. Specifically, in step 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Line 2), given a
temporary corrupted list T and honest list N , the adversary decides whether or not to corrupt node
i. To figure this out, the adversary needs to compute the expected amount of corrupted groups Xi
conditioning on nodes in T ∪ {i} already compromise and nodes in N are honest (Line 3). In detail,
the adversary should compute the conditional probability on each group is corrupted and take a sum
to derive Xi. If Xi ≥ κm, node i will be included in T (Line 5), else it will be given up by the
adversary (Line 7). The algorithm ends whenever s nodes are already chosen (Line 9) or n− s nodes
are already given up (Line 12). Algorithm 1 runs in time O(kmn) as there are at most n steps, and
in each step, one needs to compute the conditional probability for each of m groups, and Computing
each conditional probability gives the time complexity of O(k).
Clearly, Algorithm 1 is sure to end up with a size-s subset T of S = {1, 2, · · · , n}. To show that
corrupting T will lead to at least κm groups controlled by the adversary, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Suppose Algorithm 1 does not end after step i. Let Yi(i ≥ 0) be the expected amount
of corrupted nodes conditioning on T is corrupted and N is honest after step i, then Yi+1 ≥ Yi.
Specifically, we have Y0 = κm.
Proof. To show this lemma, Let X be a random variable denoting the number of corrupted groups.
Furthermore, let ai < s and bi < n− s be respectively the size of Ti and Ni after step i, ai + bi = i.
Then we have the following equality:
Yi = E[X|Ti, Ni] = s− ai
n− i · E[X|Ti ∪ {i+ 1}, Ni] +
n− s− bi
n− i · E[X|Ti, Ni ∪ {i+ 1}].
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Algorithm 1 Corrupting at least an average amount of groups.
Input: The node set S = {1, 2, · · · , n}, the group assignment scheme A with parameters m and k,
least number of nodes to control a group r, number of corrupted nodes s = γn.
Output: T ⊆ S with |T | = s, such that when T is corrupted, the adversary can at least control κm
groups, with κ defined as κ := Pr[H(n, s, k) ≥ r].
1: T = ∅, N = ∅
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: Compute the expected amount of compromised groups Xi conditioning on nodes in T ∪{i} are
malicious and nodes in N are honest
4: if Xi ≥ κm then
5: T = T ∪ {i}
6: else
7: N = N ∪ {i}
8: end if
9: if |T | ≥ s then
10: return T
11: end if
12: if |N | ≥ n− s then
13: return S −N
14: end if
15: end for
Here, E[X|Ti, Ni] is for the expectation of X conditioning on Ti malicious and Ni honest. Hence, at
least one of the E[X|Ti ∪{i+ 1}, Ni] and E[X|Ti, Ni ∪{i+ 1}] is no less than Yi. According to Line 4,
Yi+1 ≥ Yi. uunionsq
With Lemma 6, note that Y0 = κm, then the theorem is proved. uunionsq
